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The Relevance of Human Rights




In March, 1981, the American press reported that officials of
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were discussing a plan to ease
restrictions that had been imposed on its intelligence-gathering op-
erations.' These discussions stirred public concern because they in-
volved the possibility of allowing the CIA to perform covert operations
in the United States to observe perpetrators of international terror-
ism. 2 Some feared that this would lead once more to domestic spying
of American citizens by the CIA, a practice contrary to its
charter. After these revelations, officials in the intelligence com-
munity assured the public that such plans were only discussed but not
approved.' By the end of the year, however, President Ronald Reagan
signed into effect an executive order that allowed, among other things,
the CIA to engage in domestic counterintelligence operations in con-
junction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 4
The reform of intelligence activities which occurred in the late
1970's reflected a public and governmental concern for the need to
protect constitutional and human rights from government ac-
tions. The Carter Administration sought to curb the activities of the
CIA, an agency which had violated principles of human rights as
defined by international law. On January 24, 1978, President Carter
signed into effect Executive Order 12,0361 which sought to "provide
* A.B., 1978, University of Notre Dame; J.D., 1981, University of California at Los
Angeles.
1. Morganthau, Shannon & Martin, A CIA Spy Plot Backfires, NEWSWEEK. Mar. 23,
1981, at 29. See also TIME, Mar. 23, 1981, at 14.
2. Mohr, C.I.A. Aide Clarifies Stand on Restraint, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1981, at
A7, col. 1.
3. Id. In response to the alleged changes which would allow the CIA to spy do-
mestically, Admiral Bobby R. Inman, the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
said that he did not approve of these proposals. The Admiral did, however, indicate that
some changes would be necessary because of the threat of international terrorism,
4. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 202 (1982).
5. Exec. Order No. 12,036, 3 C.F.R. 112 (1979).
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for the organization and control of United States foreign intelligence
activities ... 6 Additionally, Congress adopted the Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Act of 19787 which sought to protect the pri-
vacy of the American people by requiring judicial warrants for all
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
purposes. These regulations were designed to prevent the reoccur-
rence of past abuses committed by the CIA.
These controls were adopted, however, to protect constitution-
ally-guaranteed rights only. The past transgressions of the CIA-
ranging from assassination attempts on the lives of foreign leaders to
the opening of mail and surveillance of American citizens-violated
human rights principles. Documents such as the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights prohibit invasions of privacy and intervention
by foreign states in a country's domestic affairs. Although President
Reagan's modification of Executive Order 12,036 still sought to pro-
tect constitutional rights by prohibiting certain measures such as as-
sassination, it is not clear whether the latest order recognizes principles
of international human rights. The CIA's past violations prompt an
important question: Should the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and other documents of international law form a basis for restricting
the activities of the intelligence community?
To answer this question, Part II of this article will illustrate how
human rights became a part of U.S. foreign policy. Part III will
examine the activities of the CIA which sparked reform by Congress
and will examine whether international law sanctioned these activi-
ties. Part IV will examine whether Presidents Carter or Reagan in-
tended the executive orders on intelligence to further human rights
policies. Finally, Part V will discuss the advantages and disadvan-
tages of supporting human rights in American foreign policy and
intelligence matters.
II. THE STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY
A. The Origin and Development of Human Rights in
American Political Thought
The United States first linked human rights to foreign policy
during the Kennedy Administration when Congress passed the Foreign
6. Id.




Assistance Act of 1961:8
The United states shall, in accordance with its international ob-
ligations as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in
keeping with the constitutional heritage and traditions of the United
States, promote and encourage increased respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms throughout the world without distinc-
tion as to race, sex, language, or religion. Accordingly, a prin-
cipal goal of the foreign policy of the United States shall be to
promote the increased observance of internationally recognized
human rights by all countries. 9
The Act also required the United States government to discon-
tinue assistance to those nations which violated human rights prin-
ciples: "Except under circumstances specified in this section, no
security assistance may be provided to any country the government
of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of inter-
nationally recognized human rights." 10 Despite this provision, how-
ever, the President may continue military aid to these countries if he
certifies to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chair-
man of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations "that extraordinary
circumstances exist warranting provision of such assistance." I I
The United States' commitment to human rights can be traced
to the beginning of this century. During the early 1800's, American
foreign policy focused on economic and commercial expansion, while
human rights did not play a significant role. '2 When Woodrow Wilson
became president, this trend changed. President Wilson justified for-
eign intervention with a deeply held belief that the United States had
an "exceptional mission" to spread human freedoms. This policy
was one of the causes of U.S. involvement in World War I, 1 and it
was later used as a justification for intervention in Latin America.14
8. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2443 (1979).
9. Id. § 2304(a)(1).
10. Id. § 2304(b)(2).
11. Id. See also id. § 2151 n(a). Additionally, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
set standards for granting military and economic assistance to a country. Consideration is
given to the extent of cooperation by the government in allowing an unimpeded investigation
by appropriate international organizations of its human rights record. Id. §§ 2151n(c) &
2304(b).
12. Johnson, Historical Perspectives on Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS 2, 4 (1980).
13. Id. at 4-5.
14. N. LEVIN, WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD POLITICS: AMERICA'S RESPONSE TO
WAR AND REVOLJTION 8 (1968).
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Meanwhile, the concepts of economic and social rights were
evolving as member nations fulfilled their commitment to these prin-
ciples by participating in the International Labour Organization (ILO)
founded under the Versailles Treaty in 1919. 11 The goal of the ILO,
which the U.S. joined in 1934, was to define the rights of workers
and principles of social justice. 16
President Franklin D. Roosevelt was involved in the enforcement
of human rights as was President Woodrow Wilson. In fact, President
Roosevelt combined the ideas of Wilson with his own to proclaim an
"Economic Bill of Rights.' ' 7 From this evolved the "Four Free-
doms," the basis of Roosevelt's human rights policies. 8 Roosevelt
believed that the hardship inflicted on people during the Great Depres-
sion demonstrated that the world needed economic, social and moral
security, as well as physical security. 19 With his goal to expand
economic and political rights in the United States, Roosevelt en-
couraged support for these ideas, as well as for international human
rights and world peace, before a world-wide audience at the United
Nations. 20
After World War II, the United Nations made major strides
toward the internationalization of human rights. The United Nations
Charter encourages respect for human rights by member nations. In
1948, the Human Rights Commission of the UN General Assembly
drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 21 which listed
various political, civil, social, economic and cultural
rights. Additionally, the Human Rights Commission spent eight years
drafting the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 22 and the Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.23 These two covenants,
adopted by the General Assembly in 1966, became effective ten years
later.24
15. Fagen, The United States and International Human Rights, 1946-1977, 2 UNI-
VERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS 19, 21 (1980).
16. Id. at 22.
17. Id. at 20.
18. Id. The Four Freedoms were freedom of speech and expression, freedom from
fear, freedom to worship God in the individual's own way, and freedom from want.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 21.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. President Carter signed the covenants in 1977.
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1. Restrictions against intervention
Various international legal documents provide for the enforce-
ment of human rights principles. For instance, the United Nations
and the Organization of American States (OAS) Charters contain
provisions which strongly support state sovereignty. Both charters
prohibit intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of
states. Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but
this principle shall not prejudice the application of the enforcement
measures under Chapter VII (of the Charter)25
While this clause imposes restrictions on UN intervention, the
OAS Charter's prohibition against intervention is much broader be-
cause it applies to the member states:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not
only armed force but also any other form of interference or at-
tempted threat against the personality of the State or against its
political, economic and cultural elements.26
The Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) also
prohibits such intervention. This Charter supports "non-interference
in the internal affairs of States" and "respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable fight to in-
dependent existence.' '27 The Helsinki Final Act similarly denounced
inteivention. The domestic jurisdiction clause of the document re-
quires that all participating States refrain from direct or indirect in-
tervention. 28 Further, the Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States
25. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
26. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 15, in 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2419-20, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119
U.N.T.S. 3.
27. O.A.U. CHARTER art. 3, paras. 2-3.
28. HELSINKI FINAL ACT. GUIDING PRINCIPLE VI, reprinted in 73 DEP'T ST. BULL.
323, 325 (1975). The Final Act was signed on Aug. 1, 1975. Id.
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in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations contains pro-
visions which address intervention. 29
The theory of non-intervention is based on one of the most
fundamental principles of international law-the doctrine of sovereign
equality and independence of States. 30 This theory suggests that each
State shall have the right to exist and to operate a government within
its territory without the interference of another foreign State. How
much jurisdiction a given State can enjoy over its affairs depends on
which of its internal matters it has "internationalized" through trea-
ties. According to a statement issued by the Institute of International
Law, "the reserved domain is the domain of State activities where
the State is not bound by international law. The extent of this domain
depends on international law and varies according to its develop-
ment." ' 31 Therefore, the prohibition against intervention in the do-
mestic affairs of a State applies to efforts by one government to curtail
another government's human rights violations, provided, however,
that neither human rights in general, nor specific State action, is the
subject of international obligations.
2. Internationalization of human rights
Although the UN Charter requires member States to take action
which promotes universal respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, 32 it does not internationalize all human rights. An essential
question to answer, therefore, is which human rights demand rec-
ognition? It is generally assumed that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and other related documents define "human rights"
and "fundamental freedoms" for purposes of the UN Charter.3 3 UN
policy suggests that a country's obligation to promote human rights
is violated if it pursues policies which deny the enjoyment of basic
29. 13 U.N. GAOR (188 3d plen. mtg.) at 337, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970), reprinted
in [19721 U.N. JURID. Y.B. 105. For background on how the Declaration was made, see
Sohn, The Shaping of International Law, 8 GEO. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1978).
30. 1. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 284 (2d ed. 1973).
31. 2 Annuaire de l'lnstitut de Droit International 150 (1954) cited in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 114 (P. Brown & D. Maclean eds. 1979).
32. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3 & art. 2, para. 2.
33. T. BUERGENTHAL & J. TORNEY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL EDUCATION 45-46 (1976).
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human rights on a large scale. 34 The UN Charter implies, however,
that the prohibition against intervention does not apply to govern-
mental acts or policies involving a consistent pattern of gross
violations of human rights. 35
In addition to the UN Charter, a number of treaties impose
specific human rights obligations on nations. For example, the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights provides for the privacy of the
family unit in article 12: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to
the protection of the law against such interference or at-
tacks. ' ' 36 Moreover, in article 21, the Declaration affirms the right
of citizens to choose their own leaders. 37 The Declaration also con-
siders "full development of the human personality and . . . respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms" through the educational
process is also considered a human right. 3
B. U.S. Government's Enforcement of Human Rights
Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had existed
since 1948, the Carter Administration ushered in a global awareness
of human rights in the late 1970's. A few years before President
Carter took office, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was amended
to introduce more severe economic sanctions against human rights
violators. The 1973 amendment boldly stated that "[i]t is the sense
of Congress that the President should deny any economic or military
assistance to the government of any foreign country which practices
the internment or imprisonment of that country's citizens for political
purposes." 3 9 Additionally, Senator Edward M. Kennedy initiated an
amendment to the Act during the same year to address human rights
34. HUMAN RIGHtTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 32, at 115.
35. Id. See generally, E.S.C. Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. IA) at 8-9,
U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add. 1 (1970), reprinted in L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, BASIC DOC-
UMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 111 (1973).
36. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 12, G.A. Res. 217A (i1), U.N. Doc.
A/810 at 71 (1948).
37. Id. art. 21.
38. Id. art. 6, para. 2. See also Hassan, The Right to Be Different: An Exploratory
Proposal for the Creation of a New Human Right, 5 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 67
(1982).
39. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 § 32, Pub. L. No. 93-189, 87 Stat. 714, 733
(1973).
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abuses in Chile. 40 In 1974, other human rights measures were adopted
which placed restrictions on trade with human rights violators and
withdrew security assistance to countries that practiced torture .
4
Congress further strengthened its commitment to human rights
in 1976 by amending section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act. This
amendment established a mandatory cutoff of security assistance for
gross human rights violators. 42 Congress also required that full re-
ports must be submitted by the Secretary of State on behalf of those
countries requesting security assistance concerning those countries'
observation of internationally recognized human rights. 43
This strengthening of human rights enforcement by the U.S.
government was followed by an even more aggressive policy by
President Carter. In an address before the United Nations, he declared
the United States' strong commitment to human rights:
We in the United States accept this responsibility [of promoting
human rights] in the fullest and most constructive sense. Ours
is a commitment, and not just a political posture. I know per-
haps as well as anyone that our own ideals in the area of human
rights have not always been attained in the United States, but the
American people have an abiding commitment to the full reali-
zation of these ideals. And we are determined, therefore, to deal
with our deficiencies quickly and openly. 44
While recognizing an obligation to promote all human rights, as de-
fined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the President
seemed to emphasize a need to defend those human rights which were
fundamental. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance further outlined what
the Carter Administration meant by human rights: the right to be free
from governmental violation of the integrity of the person; the right
to food, shelter, health care, education; and the right to enjoy civil
and political liberties. 4
5
40. Id. § 35, 87 Stat. at 734.
41. Congress adopted the Jackson-Vanik amendment which conditioned trade on the
existence of favorable emigration policies. SeeTrade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1980).
42. See International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 §
502B(a), Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729, 748 (1976)(amending the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961).
43. Id. § 502B(b), 90 Stat. at 748-49.
44. Address by President Jimmy Carter to the General Assembly of the United Nations,
Mar. 17, 1977 reprinted in I PUB. PAPERS 450 (1977).
45. Vance, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, 76 DEPT ST. BULL. 505 (1977)(Address
by Secretary of State Vance to students at the University of Georgia School of Law at Athens,
Georgia on Apr. 30, 1976).
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The Carter Administration vigorously enforced its policy. By
the end of 1978, the U.S. had opposed fifty-two loans to sixteen
countries on human rights grounds. 46 In other instances, countries
were notified that the human rights concerns of the Carter Admin-
istration would result in a vote against a loan from an American
bank. In February, 1977, the Carter Administration reduced its as-
sistance to Argentina and two other countries. This was believed to
be the first time a country had publicly announced a reduction in
foreign aid on human rights grounds. 47 In July, 1978, the United
States Export-Import Bank withheld a $270 million loan for Argentina
because of human rights violations. 48 This produced an angry reaction
from American businessmen in that country as well as from Argentine
officials .49
President Carter issued Executive Order 12,036 which clarified
and restricted the duties of the American intelligence commu-
nity. While the Executive Order appears, on the surface, to protect
some human rights principles enunciated by the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, it is difficult to determine whether a direct link
exists between Carter's human rights campaign and the Executive
Order. It will be useful, therefore, to examine the manner in which
the CIA abused its statutory authority and the human rights impli-
cations of such actions.
III. VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The CIA was established after World War II by the National
Security Act of 1947.50 This Act gave the CIA authority to collect
46. Schneider, A New Administration's New Policy: The Rise of Power of Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 10 (P. Brown & D. Maclean eds.
1979).
47. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1977, at AI, col. 6.
48. De Onis, U.S. Denial of Loan Angers Argentines, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1978,
at A4, col. 3. Alexander Perry, a representative in Argentina of the St. Joe Mining Company,
led a delegation of American businessmen in protesting the decision at a meeting with
Ambassador Raul Castro.
49. Id.
50. 59 U.S.C. § 403 (1951 & Supp. 1983). The Act grants the CIA power to
coordinate the nation's intelligence activities and to correlate, evaluate and disseminate
intelligence which affects national security. In addition, the Agency was to perform such
other duties and functions related to intelligence as the National Security Council might
direct. The Act also made the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) responsible for pro-
tecting intelligence sources and methods.
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foreign intelligence which presumably was to be used in formulating
foreign policy. 51 For years, the CIA had wide latitude to perform a
variety of missions to influence events abroad.5 2 In 1975, the world
learned about the extent of the CIA's covert activities, ranging from
assassination attempts on foreign leaders to mind control experi-
ments. In December, 1974, the New York Times, in a story by re-
porter Seymour Hersh, reported that the CIA maintained files on as
many as 10,000 American citizens who were suspected of being
dissenters against the Vietnam War. 53 After Congress ordered in-
vestigations into the Agency's activities, more revelations about CIA
activities followed. President Gerald Ford also ordered a separate
investigation to be performed by a blue-ribbon committee headed by
Vice President Nelson Rockefeller. 54
A. Assassination Attempts on Foreign Leaders
During the year the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was drafted,
a major covert operation was being planned by the CIA. A new
leader, with possible Communist ties, had taken power in the
Congo.5 5 On August 18, 1960, the CIA Chief of Station sent the
following cable to CIA Headquarters:
EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENC-
ING CLASSIC COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOV-
ERNMENT. MANY FORCES AT WORK HERE: SOVIETS
* * * COMMUNIST PARTY, ETC. ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT
TO DETERMINE MAJOR INFLUENCING FACTORS TO
51. Id.
52. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(5) (1951). This provision is broadly worded: "to perform
such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the
National Security Council may from time to time direct." Much of the authority to perform
covert operations derives from this provision.
53. Hersh, Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other
Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1974, at Al, col. 8. Anonymous sources
told Hersh that the CIA had authorized agents to follow and photograph participants in anti-
war and other demonstrations. The CIA also set up a network of informants who were
ordered to penetrate anti-war groups. Students were not the only subject of these files
maintained by the CIA; the list included members of Congress as well.
54. Hersh, Ford Names Rockefeller to Head Inquiry Into CIA; Wants Report in 90
Days, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1975, at A l, col. 6.
55. ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS: AN INTERIM RE-
PORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITrEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS wITH RE-
SPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. S. REP. No. 465, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13
(1975)[hereinafter cited as ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS]. This-was an interim report
which detailed allegations of U.S. involvement in assassination plots against foreign leaders.
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PREDICT OUTCOME STRUGGLE FOR POWFR, DECISIVE
PERIOD NOT FAR OFF. WHETHER OR NOT LUMUMBA
ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST PLAYING COMMIE GAME
TO ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI-WEST FORCES
RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND THERE MAY
BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TO TAKE ACTION TO
AVOID ANOTHER CUBA. 56
The problem was Patrice Lumumba, the new leader of the Congo,
a country which had recently declared its independence from
Belgium. The immediate goal of the CIA was to replace Lumumba
with a pro-Western leader. On August 19, 1960, the director of the
CIA's covert operations branch sent a cable to Leopoldville, in the
Congo, authorizing a "removal" of Lumumba. 57 A week later, CIA
Director Allen Dulles sent another cable to the Leopoldville Station
Office stating:
IN HIGH QUARTERS HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-CUT CON-
CLUSION THAT IF [LUMUMBA] CONTINUES TO HOLD
HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITABLE RESULT WILL AT BEST
BE CHAOS AND AT WORST PAVE THE WAY TO COM-
MUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE CONGO WITH DISASTROUS
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PRESTIGE OF THE UN AND
FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD GENER-
ALLY. CONSEQUENTLY WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS RE-
MOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE
AND THAT UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD
BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION.58
Before Dulles sent the cable to the Congo, Bissell and CIA
scientist Joseph Schneider, discussed the technical capability of the
CIA to assassinate foreign leaders. 59 After concluding that it was
possible to perform this mission, Schneider (who was given the alias
"Joe Braun") was sent to the Congo on September 26, 1960, with
lethal chemicals to assassinate Lumumba. 60 The designated chief as-
sassin was Congo Station Officer Victor Hedgman. 61 Although the
56. Id. at 14 (quoting CIA Cable, Bronson Tweedy to Leopoldville, the Congo, Aug.
18, 1960).
57. Id. at 15 (quoting CIA Cable Directive to Leopoldville, the Congo, Aug. 19,
1960).
58. Id. (quoting CIA Cable, CIA Director Allen Dulles to Congo Station Officer,
Aug. 26, 1960).
59. Id. at 20.
60. Id. at 22, 23.
61. Id. at 26.
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CIA had designed a number of ways to assassinate Lumumba, the
UN had obtained protective custody of the Congolese leader, making
an attempt more difficult. 62 Lumumba died on January 17, 1961, and
it is unclear which of his many opponents were responsible.
63
Lumumba and two of his supporters were en route by plane to
Bakwanga. The flight, however, was redirected to Ilisabethville when
it was learned that UN troops were waiting at the airport. 64 It was
reported that Lumumba died at the hands of hostile villagers who
were part of an anti-Lumumba faction in the Congo.65 The UN in-
vestigation discounted this theory and found instead that it was most
likely that Lumumba had been killed by political enemies. 66
Three potential assailants have been identified. In November,
1960, a foreign agent identified as WI/ROGUE attempted to form an
execution squad without the consent of the CIA. 67 Second, the CIA
may have been involved. However, although the extensive planning
efforts seem to indicate that the CIA could have caused Lumumba's
death, Congressional investigations concluded that the CIA had no
involvement. 6 Instead, Congress discovered evidence by which an
inference could be drawn that President Eisenhower authorized
Lumumba's assassination. 69
According to the testimony of Robert H. Johnson, a member
of the National Security Council (NSC) staff from 1951 to 1962,
President Eisenhower had made a direct order to the Director of
Central Intelligence to assassinate Lumumba.70 Testimony of other
62. Id. at 22, 33.
63. Id. at 50.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 15 (quoting CIA Cable, Leopoldville to CIA Director, Aug. 24, 1960). This
cable revealed that anti-Lumumba forces-although willing to eliminate his influence-saw
no adequate replacement for Lumumba.
66. Id. at 50.
67. Id. at 43. QJ/WIN one of the assailants, was a foreign citizen with a criminal
background and was recruited in Europe for the plan. This code name was used to provide
deep cover for the agent's identity. WI/ROGUE was described as a "man ... who would
try anything once, at least." The CIA had intentions to use him as a utility agent in order
to organize and conduct a surveillance team, to intercept packages, to blow up bridges and
to execute other assignments requiring positive action. Id. at 46.
68. Id. at 48-49, 50, 52.
69. Id. at 51-60.
70. Id. at 55-56. It was difficult for Johnson to recollect the exact words President
Eisenhower used in suggesting an assassination of Lumumba-and understandaby so, since
Johnson's testimony occurred some fifteen years after the NSC meeting took place. Johnson,
nevertheless, remembered that what the President said at that time shocked him so deeply
that despite his failure to recollect the President's words verbatim, the shock effect on Johnson
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individuals revealed that members of the NSC had discussed various
types of covert actions aimed to reduce Lumumba's power, such as
arranging a vote of no confidence in the Congolese Senate. 71
Although other NSC members did not recall President Eisenhower
making any references to the assassination plot,72 one participant in
the NSC meetings, Douglas Dillon, stated that there might not be
much evidence of discussions between the President and the CIA in
order to shield Eisenhower from any negative publicity. 73
The assassination attempt of Lumumba and the overall plan to
destroy his political power was contrary to international law. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibits any nation from
circumventing the will of the people or undermining the authority of
the government. The Universal Declaration states that "[t]he will of
the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections . . . . ",74 The
CIA activities regarding Lumumba violated the spirit of this document
since an attempt to kill or incapacitate him was not a result of the
people's will to remove him by an election process. Furthermore,
the NSC's attempt to arrange a vote of no confidence also violated
the Universal Declaration because it would not have been initiated
by the Congolese Senate. Instead, it would have been the influence
of a foreign power.
In addition to the assassination attempt on Patrice Lumumba,
the CIA had also planned to eliminate Cuba's Fidel Castro. 75 Over
a five year period, there were at least eight plots to assassinate
could have only been caused by an order to assassinate the political figure:
At some time during that discussion, President Eisenhower said something-
I can no longer remember his words-that came across to me as an order for the
assassination of Lumumba who was then at the center of political conflict and
controversy in the Congo. There was no discussion; the meeting simply moved
on. I remember my sense of that moment quite clearly because the President's
statement came as a great shock to me ....
I must confess that in thinking about the incident more recently I have
had some doubts. As is well known, it was quite uncharacteristic of President
Eisenhower to make or announce policy decisions in NSC meetings. . . . All I
can tell you with any certainty at the present moment is my sense of that moment
in the Cabinet Room of the White House.
Id.
71. Id. at 60 (citing National Security Council Special Group Minutes, Aug. 25,
1960).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 61.
74. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 36, art. 21, para. 3.
75. G.A. Res. 217A (111), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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Castro. 76 Among the plans discussed were a campaign to destroy
Castro's public image by sabotaging his public speaking
engagements. 77 This was to be achieved by spraying Castro's broad-
casting studio with a chemical which had effects similar to LSD. 78 One
chemical, to be used in another plan, consisted of thalium salts, a
strong depilatory that was to be dusted on Castro's shoes to make his
beard fall out. 79 The first attempt on the life of the Cuban leader
sponsored by the CIA took place in 196080 when the CIA formulated
an accident plot. The plan was later abandoned. 8' In a second plan
discussed in 1960, a CIA official was given a box of Castro's favorite
cigars with instructions to treat them with lethal poison. They were
contaminated with botulinum toxin which is so potent that a person
would die after putting one in his mouth. CIA records indicate that
the cigars were ready on October 7, 1960, but it is not known whether
ah attempt was made to pass the cigars to Castro.82 On November
30, 1961, President John F. Kennedy launched Operation
MONGOOSE, a project to "use our available assets. . . to help Cuba
overthrow the Communist regime.' '83
The Congressional investigations also examined whether the CIA
was linked to the assassination of Rafael Trujillo, former leader of
the Dominican Republic. 84 Trujillo was a brutal dictator, and both
the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations encouraged his removal
from office. Although there is no evidence that the U.S. instigated
any assassination efforts, evidence before the Committee tended to
link U.S. officials to the assassination plots. 8 5 On February 10 and
15, 1961, CIA officials met with Dominican dissident leaders who
indicated to agents that Trujillo must be assassinated if the govern-
ment was to be overthrown. 86 Subsequently, the CIA sent pistols,
76. Id. at 71.




81. Id. at 73.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 139 (citing Memorandum from President Kennedy to the Secretary of State,
et al. (Nov. 30, 1961)).
84. Id. at 191.
85. Id.
86. Id..at 198 (citing CIA Memoranda of Feb. 13, 1961 & Feb. 16, 1961).
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rifles and grenades to its station in Ciudad Trujillo. 87 On May 30,
1961, Trujillo was ambushed and assassinated near San Cristobal,
Dominican Republic.88 Although the assassination closely paralleled
the plan disclosed by the action group to American representatives in
the Dominican Republic and passed on to officials in Washington at
the CIA and the State Department, no evidence was discovered im-
plicating the CIA. 89
The assassinations of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh
Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were attributed to Buddhist
uprisings following the slaying of Buddhists by South Vietnamese
troops and subsequent dissatisfaction on the part of the U.S. govern-
ment with the Diem regime's handling of that problem. 9° Evidence
indicated that the U.S. offered encouragement for the coup but did
not desire the assassinations. 9' By September, 1963, American dis-
pleasure with the Diem regime had increased; the Agency for Inter-
national Development (AID) Director threatened that Congress might
cut economic aid to South Vietnam if the regime did not change its
course 92
The U.S. continued to dfsapprove assassination plans, 93 but on
November 1, 1963, after the U.S. Embassy was given just four min-
utes warning before the coup began, Conein, a CIA official, gave
$42,000 to South Vietnamese General Don to procure food for his
troops and to pay death benefits to those killed in the coup. 94 That
afternoon, the takeover generals demanded Diem's resignation. 95 He
refused at first, but later offered to surrender unconditionally. An
escort was sent to the palace, but neither Diem nor his brother were
present. Conein received orders from the President of the United
States to locate Diem. A South Vietnamese general informed Conein
that Diem and Nhu had committed suicide. The details are not known
and no CIA involvement has ever been proven. 96
87. Id. at 211.
88. Id. at 213.
89. Id. (citing Cable from State Department to Dearborn (May 29, 1961)).
90. Id. at 217-20.
91. Id. at 217.
92. Id. at 220.
93. Id. at 221.
94. Id. at 222.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 223.
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Finally, Congress discovered that the Nixon Administration was
directly responsible for overthrowing the regime of Salvador
Allende. On September 4, 1970, Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens won
Chile's presidential election. 97 Eleven days later, President Richard
Nixon informed CIA Director Richard Helms that an Allende regime
would be unacceptable to the U.S.98 Helm's handwritten notes of
that meeting reflect the urgency of Nixon's intentions."
The following day, September 16, 1970, Helms held a meeting
with officials at CIA Headquarters to discuss Nixon's wishes. 1°° It
was decided that the best way to carry out the Presidential order was
to organize a military coup.'01 However, all Chilean military con-
spirators had one obstacle to overcome-General Rene Schneider,
Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army, who insisted that consti-
tutional process be followed in removing Allende from
power.' 0 2 Unsuccessful kidnap attempts were made on October 19
and 20, 1970. On October 22, 1970, the CIA passed machine guns
and ammunition to the group of military officers who made the first
abduction attempt; Schneider was killed later that day by different
conspirators using different weapons. 03 While it has been established
that CIA efforts to organize a coup began prior to October 15, 1970,
the testimony conflicted as to whether or not the coup was specifically
authorized by the White House. 04 Then Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger and General Alexander Haig testified that on October 15,
1970, the White House disapproved CIA efforts to promote a military
coup in Chile. Conversely, CIA officials testified that their activities,
97. Id. at 225.
98. Id. at 227.
99. Id. Helms wrote the following comments:
One in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile
worth spending
not concerned risks involved
no involvement of Embassy
$10,000,000 available, more if necessary
full-time job-best men we have
game plan
make the economy scream
48 hours for plan of action.
100. Id. at 228.
101. Id. at 228-29.
102. Id. at 225.
103. Id. at 226.
104. Id. at 246.
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before and after October 15, 1970, were known and approved by the
White House.10 5
These assassination attempts on the lives of Lumumba, Castro,
Diem, Trujillo and Schneider constituted violations of the OAS
Charter. These plans show a willful attempt to interfere with the
political elements and events of other nations and a desire to eliminate
the influence of its political leader without the use of the constitutional
or judicial process. Despite such actions, the United States claimed
to have recognized the Charter as binding international law at the time
these assassination attempts occurred during the 1960's and 1970's.
B. Electronic and Mail Surveillance of American and
Foreign Citizens
Along with the well-chronicled files maintained on anti-war
activists, the CIA surveilled the mail through project
SGPOINTER/HGLINGUAL.06 The program, which was started by
the CIA Office of Security, was designed to detect communication
of any information through the mail by persons suspected of anti-
American activity. It was decided that this information might be of
interest to the government.
The mail operation involved obtaining access to mail sent to or
from the Soviet Union and to copy the names and addresses of the
communicators. The program operated as follows: mail to and from
the Soviet Union and other countries was processed through the branch
post office at LaGuardia Airport in New York City. As mail was
received, it was screened, and the exteriors of the envelopes were
photographed. About sixty items a day were set aside and then co-
vertly removed from the post office. From there, mail was carried
to the Manhattan Field Office. The letters were steamed open, re-
produced, resealed and sent back to the LaGuardia Post Office the
following morning. Films of the letters were then sent to CIA
Headquarters. 07
The Agency wished to learn about persons with ties to hostile
governments. In many cases, however, the information discovered
105. Id.
106. Intelligence Activities-Mail Openings, Senate Select Comm. to Study Govern-
mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., I st Sess. 187 (1975).
107. Id.
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consisted of only gossip about relatives and friends. 08 While the
public had no knowledge about the mail opening campaign conducted
by the CIA, some of the postmaster generals knew about the mail
surveillance project. In fact, three Postmaster Generals, Arthur
Summerfield, J. Edward Day and Minton M. Blount, approved the
operation once they were informed by the CIA Director.1°9
The government used electronic surveillance in a variety of
ways. In an effort to prevent national security leaks during the Nixon
Administration, Chief of Staff Alexander Haig ordered wiretaps on
seventeen public figures, including members of the press." 0 In a
Freedom of Information Act request released to the Los Angeles Times,
it was learned that Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy ordered the
CIA to wiretap civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr.'
The electronic and mail surveillance conducted by the CIA vio-
lated domestic law as well as international law. According to the
National Security Act, the Agency's Charter, the CIA has the re-
sponsibility to collect foreign intelligence only. "2 The FBI is charged
with the responsibility of collecting domestic intelligence and coun-
terintelligence. Furthermore, this activity constituted an invasion of
privacy which is prohibited by international law." 3
In article 17, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights states: "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation." "14 The American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man states that "[e]very
108. Id. (citing Memorandum from Chief of Operations, Deputy Directorate of Plan-
ning to Director of Central Intelligence on Project HGLINGUAL). This was the result of
the examination of thirty-five communications.
109. Id. at 202.
110. Wash. Post, Dec. 20, 1980, at Al, col. 2.
111. See Nelson, Documents Reveal CIA Spied on Civil Rights Leader, Martin Luther
King, L.A. Times, Feb. 20, 1980, at A4, col. 1.
112. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976). It is the duty of the CIA to:
[clorrelate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide
for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using
where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Provided, That the Agency
shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security func-
tions.
Id. (emphasis in original and added).
113. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
114. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. (XXI), 220, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368,
373. The U.S. had signed but not ratified this Covenant as of Dec. 31, 1979.
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person has the right to the inviolability and transmission of his
correspondence." "15
C. Human Drug Experimentation and Behavior
Modification
The CIA, through various government agencies, coordinated drug
experiments aimed at discovering how the human mind could be
controlled. 116 An investigation by the Senate Subcommittee on Health
and Scientific Research in 1977 disclosed that the Army participated
in such experiments from 1969 to 1973, and that the Navy was in-
volved from 1947 to 1973. Both departments received funds from
the CIA to conduct the experiments."1
7
During the past three decades, there were approximately
six experimentation programs conducted by the intelligence
community: MKDELTA,''1 MKULTRA," ' 9  MKNAOMI, 20
MKSEARCH,'2' MKCHICKWIT (or HICKWIT),' 22 and MKOFTEN
(or OFTEN). 23 Congressional investigations revealed that the Army
was involved in two programs, MKCHICKWIT and MKOFTEN,
which were designed to identify new drugs in Europe and Asia and
to test the behavioral effects of these drugs on humans and
115. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX,
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. IJV/I.4 Rev. (1965). This declaration was adopted by the
Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogota, Colombia on Mar. 30-May
2, 1948.
116. See Human Drug Testing by the CIA, Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Health and Scientific Research of the Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977).
117. Id. at 157 (citing Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense on Experimentation
Programs that had CIA Sponsorship or Participation (Sept. 20, 1977)).
118. Id. at 158. This was the first project established by the CIA in October, 1952,
for the use of biochemicals in clandestine operations. It is possible that it was never made
operational.
119. Id. This was the successor to project MKDELTA, which was established in
April, 1953. It was terminated in the late 1960's and involved ways of controlling human
behavior by the use of drugs.
120. Id. at 157-58. Beginning in the 1950's, the project involved stockpiling severely
incapacitating and lethal materials and developing gadgetry for disseminating the materials.
121. Id. at 158. The objective of the program was to learn how to manipulate human
behavior through the use of drugs.
122. Id. An investigation project to identify new drug programs and developments
in Europe and Asia and to obtain information and samples.
123. Id. A part of the MKSEARCH project, its objective was to test the behaviorial
and toxicological effects of certain drugs on animals and humans.
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animals. 124 There is no evidence that the Navy was directly involved
in these two projects, but there is evidence of Navy participation in
other programs which involved human experimentation.
25
In October, 1954, the Navy attempted to devise a technique to
induce brain concussions. After research revealed that this could be
achieved by introducing a small quantity of gas into the spinal cord,
the CIA took over the project and named it MKULTRA. The CIA
began to use this technique with subjects of interrogation and brain-
washing. 126
Additionally, the CIA conducted experiments with humans using
LSD. 27 In another project called BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE, 28 the
CIA sought to investigate the effect of marijuana and heroin on speech
inducement. Although six known volunteers were used in 1950, the
Office of Naval Intelligence conducted similar experiments with hu-
man subjects in Europe in 1952, one of whom was a Soviet defec-
tor. These tests were apparently not satisfactory because the drugs
had such a bitter taste and it was not possible to keep the human
subjects from knowing about the test. 29
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights condemns such ac-
tivities. Article Five declares that "[n]o one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment."' 30 The type of experiments conducted by the government
could be considered inhuman by the standards of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights. Of course, not all experiments in which
humans are involved would constitute inhumane treatment. An ex-
periment to test whether laetrile cures cancer in humans would not
be considered inhumane because the purpose of the test would be to
eradicate a fatal disease, hopefully resulting in a longer life for the
human subject. A drug experiment, however, which has a dynamic
effect when used by a human being could cause irreversible damage
to the brain or other organs. Altering the state of that person's phys-
ical being to the point of making that person experience a life different
than previously experienced should be considered inhumane.
124. Id.
125. id. at 161.
126. Id. at 164-65.
127. Id. at 166.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 167.
130. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 36, art. 5.
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D. Efforts to Initiate Reform
After conducting a series of investigations into the activities of
the CIA, Congress declared that reform was necessary. Even before
the Congressional investigation, former Directors of Central Intelli-
gence (DCI), Richard Helms and William Colby, issued internal CIA
orders banning assassination.' 3 Congress decided that more effective
action was necessary and suggested the adoption of a statute address-
ing past abuses of the CIA. Although federal law made it a crime
to kill or to conspire to kill a foreign official or foreign official guest
while such a person is in the United States, 3 2 there was no law making
it a crime to assassinate or to conspire to assassinate a foreign official
while the individual was outside the United States. It was proposed,
therefore, that a bill be considered to prevent the assassination of
foreign leaders outside the United States. 133
IV. EXECUTIVE ORDERS ON INTELLIGENCE-WERE HUMAN
RIGHTS MEANT TO APPLY?
A. Restrictions
Executive Order 12,333, issued by President Reagan, was in-
tended to reform the intelligence community while liberalizing some
rules from Executive Order 12,036, issued by President
Carter. Executive Order 12,333 clarifies the coordination duties of
the DCI. The DCI is the primary advisor to the President and to the
National Security Council on national foreign intelligence mat-
ters. 3 4 Order 12,333 lists other duties for various components of the
intelligence community: the Departments of State, Treasury, and
Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency,
and Federal Bureau of Investigation. 35
Concerning restrictions imposed on the CIA and FBI, the
131. ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS, supra note 55, at 282. The order stated:
"[ilt has recently again been alleged in the press that the CIA engages in assas-
sinations. As you are well aware, this is not the case, and Agency policy has long
been clear on this issue. To underline it, however, I direct that no such activity
or operation be undertaken, assisted or suggested by any of our personnel."
Id. (citing Memorandum from Richard Helms to Deputy Directors of the CIA (Mar. 6,
1972)).
132. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1116-1117 (1976).
133. ALLEGED ASSASStNATION PLOTS, supra note 55, at 289.
134. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 202 (Part 1.5(a))(1982).
135. Id. at 206-10 (Parts 1.9-1.14).
19831
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
document explicitly prohibits assassinations and human
experimentation 13 6 by anyone employed by the U.S. govern-
ment. 37 The Executive Order also states that the CIA has the re-
sponsibility to collect foreign intelligence and counterintelligence,
38
and the FBI is responsible for collecting counterintelligence within
the U.S. The Executive Order also establishes an Intelligence Ov-
ersight Board to monitor intelligence operations. 139
B. The Search for a Human Rights Link
Executive Orders 12,333 and 12,036 provide little, if any, clues
as to whether these documents were intended to protect international
human rights. President Reagan stated that the purpose of Executive
Order 12,333 was to collect" [t]imely and accurate information about
the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers,
organizations, and persons and their agents . . . . " 14 Additionally,
President Reagan said that the Order sought to control U.S. intelli-
gence activities while protecting the constitutional rights of citizens. 141
It appears that President Reagan, by mentioning "protecting the
Constitutional rights of citizens," intended to modify the Executive
Order to protect rights granted by the U.S. Constitution. Under the
U.S. Constitution, it is possible to seek relief for government vio-
lations of rights that may be committed by an intelligence
agency. 42 Yet because there is no reference to international law or
human rights, it is unlikely that the Executive Order intended human
rights concepts to be included within the American concept of privacy
and civil liberties.
It was also unclear if human rights concepts were meant to restrict
intelligence activities during the Carter Administration. President
Carter introduced Executive Order 12,036, which is substantially
similar to Reagan's Executive Order. When examining other relevant
statements made by President Carter, his application of human rights
to the intelligence community is ambiguous. His remarks upon signing
136. Id. at 213 (Part 2.10).
137. Id. at 213 (Part 2.11).
138. Id. at 205 (Part 1.8(a)).
139. Cf. id. at 205 (Part 1.7(d)).
140. id. at 200 (Preamble).
141. Id. at 200-01 (Preamble).
142. See e.g., Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)(CIA's
reading and copying of mail without a warrant violates the First and Fourth Amendments).
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Executive Order 12,036 suggest that he did not have international
human rights principles in mind as a basis for restricting illegal in-
telligence-gathering activities. After briefly clarifying the coordi-
nation of duties of the DCI, President Carter stated that this "order
gives a great deal of additional responsibility to the Attorney General
to make sure that the civil liberties and the privacy of American
citizens is adequately protected and that the constitutional provisions
and the laws of our Nation are carried out precisely."1 43
President Carter only identifies restrictions which seek to protect
those rights guaranteed by federal statutory and constitutional
law. Eleven months later, when speaking in commemoration of the
thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, President Carter emphasized that human rights policy
applies to U.S. government agencies in their dealings abroad:
We will speak out when individual rights are violated in other
lands. The Universal Declaration means that no nation can draw
the cloak of sovereignty over torture, disappearances, officially
sanctioned bigotry, or the destruction of freedom within its own
borders. The message that is being delivered by all of our rep-
resentatives abroad-whether they are from the Department of
State or Commerce or Agriculture or Defense or whatever-is that
the policies regarding human rights count very much in the char-
acter of our own relations with other individual countries. '44
What conclusion can be drawn from these statements? It appears
that while there was a de facto recognition that human rights principles
should apply to the intelligence community on one occasion, the Carter
Administration never made a de jure application of international hu-
man rights principles to the conduct of the intelligence commu-
nity. Despite this failure to make a link between human rights and
the conduct of the government in its dealings abroad, it can be argued
that the Executive Order embodies these human rights principles be-
cause it prohibits the violation of rights mentioned in international
143. President's Remarks on Signing of Executive Order No. 12,036 (Jan. 24, 1978),
I PUB. PAPERS 189, 190 (emphasis added).
144. President:s Remarks at White House Meeting Commemorating 30th Anniversary
of the Signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 6, 1978), 11 PUB. PAPERS
2161, 2162 (emphasis added). Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance expressed similar views
in a major foreign policy address at the University of Georgia Law School in 1977: "Our
policy [of human rights] is to be applied within our society as well as abroad. We welcome
constructive criticism at the same time as we offer it." Speech by Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance on Law Day Before the University of Georgia Law School (Apr. 30, 1977), reprinted
in 76 DEP'T ST. BULL. 505, 507 (1977).
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legal documents.
What can be inferred from Executive Order 12,333? It can be
said that the Reagan Administration never made a link between a
respect for human rights with respect to intelligence activities. No
link was made in the Executive Order, and it seems that only civil
rights and liberties granted by the Constitution were meant to be
protected by the Order.
V. THE CASE FOR USING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO
CONTROL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Once the Reagan Administration assumed power in Washington,
Secretary of State Alexander Haig immediately announced that the
major foreign policy concern would shift from human rights to in-
ternational terrorism. 45 Shortly thereafter, President Reagan ap-
pointed Ernest Lefever to head the State Department's human rights
division, a person regarded by some observers as not an avid supporter
of human rights. 146 While the Reagan Administration's commitment
to human rights can be best evaluated once the policy has been applied
during the course of its entire tenure, the State Department's shift in
focus and the appointment of Lefever have aroused a congregation
of skeptics who are pessimistic about the present government's strong
support for human rights causes around the globe.
The recent shift in focus from human rights to international
terrorism raises an important question: Is it practical at all to pursue
an aggressive stance on human rights? Critics who oppose a strong
stance on human rights in American foreign policy claim that such a
position only expresses a hope that a nation will abandon its sover-
eignty. In fact, some critics consider a strong stance on human rights
a form of intervention. Lefever stated that "[m]aking human rights
the chief, or even major, foreign policy determinant carries dangers
... . International law forbids any state from interfering in the in-
ternal, political, judicial and economic affairs of an-
other. Fundamentally, the quality of life in a political community
should be determined by its own people . . . .
Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned that a human
rights-based foreign policy has its limitations. He stated that there
145. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1981, at AI0, col. 6.
146. N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1981, at A8, col. 4.
147. Lefever, The Rights Standard, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1977 (Opinion-Editorial),
at 23, col. 2.
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are some situations in which it would be better to abandon human
rights in order to further other national interests:
[R]esponsibility compels . . . a recognition of our limits. Our
alliances . . . serve the cause of peace by strengthening regional
and world security. If well conceived, they are not favors to others
but a recognition of common interests. They should be withdrawn
when those interests change; they should not, as a general rule,
be used as levers to extort a standard of conduct or to punish acts
with which we do not agree. 
48
A human rights position, therefore, may have to be sacrificed if it
should jeopardize a relationship with an ally or if it will enhance our
national interests.
Kissinger's reflections could serve as an omen to what occurred
during the Carter Administration's campaign to promote human
rights. After withholding a $270 million loan to Argentina on human
rights grounds in August, 1978, President Carter ordered the reversal
of the Export-Import Bank's decision three months later. 149 The initial
decision was provoked by torture and execution practiced by Argentine
security forces. Carter's veto of the loan, however, produced adverse
results. There were protests from Argentine officials and from the
American business community located in that country. The U.S.
Ambassador to Argentina, Raul Castro, said that the sanctions weak-
ened the position of the Argentine government. 50 Also, there had
been criticism of a State Department decision in 1978 to sell $120
million worth of military equipment to Argentina, although there had
been no improvement in that country's human rights record.'' Other
critics maintain that President Carter's application of human rights
had become too moralistic, that is, he began denouncing abuses for
moralistic reasons instead of legal ones. 2 Carter's policy came under
148. Kissinger, Moral Promise and Practical Needs, 75 DEPT ST. BULL. 597, 603
(1976).
149. DeOnis, U.S. Reverses a Ban on Argentina Loan, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1978,
at Al, col. 1.
150. Id.
151. De Young & Krause, Our Mixed Signals on Human Rights in Argentina, Wash.
Post, Oct. 29, 1978 (Editorials), at C8, col. 3.
152. See HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY 93-105 (P. Brown & D. Maclean eds.
1979), and Forsythe, American Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality,
2 UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS 35, 39-40 (1980). Furthermore, it was recognized by many
observers that President Carter eventually backed down on his strong human rights stance,
opting for a more balanced approach to applying human rights principles in his foreign
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attack by Edward Mezvinsky, the U.S. representative to the UN
Human Rights Commission. Mezvinsky's view on the Carter human
rights policy was that "[1little real progress on human rights can be
expected so long as it is seen as America's own little corner on
morality." 153
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite these criticisms and shortcomings, the application of
human rights principles to the conduct of the intelligence community
presents a different task. First, it must be realized that by using
international law as a guideline for the intelligence community, it
becomes an internal application of human rights and not an external
one. Imposing values on our own system would not involve imposing
values on the government of another country as in the situation of
Argentina. A recognition by the intelligence community that human
rights principles must be observed would not affect our relations with
other countries. By recognizing that human rights principles apply
to our government's dealings abroad, the U.S. would emphasize to
American citizens and to other nations that it respects the rights of
others in the course of pursuing foreign intelligence matters.
Moreover, beyond the moral reasons for supporting this doctrine,
human rights principles should be applied because they are rooted in
international law. The U.S., as a signatory to the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, has a responsibility to respect the rights of
other States,' 54 not to intervene,' 55 and to faithfully fulfill obligations
imposed by treaties and other sources of international law.' 56 As a
signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the U.S. has
a responsibility to obey the spirit of this document. Since the en-
forcement of human rights is a legal obligation, a more compelling
reason for adherence can be provided where a moralistic ground might
fail. Therefore, if it is clear that there is an international legal basis
policy. After conceding that human rights had to be viewed with realism, President Carter
stated, "[h]uman rights cannot be the only goal of our foreign policy, not in a world in
which peace is literally a matter of survival." See Schweigler, Carter's Detente Pol-
icy: Change or Continuity?, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S.- FOREIGN POLICY 163 (B. Rubin
& E. Spiro eds. 1979).
153. Mezvinsky, Human Rights and International Organizations, 78 DEP'T ST. BULL.
52 (1978)(based on an address at Grinnell College in Grinnell, Iowa on Apr. 6, 1978).
154. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 10, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
155. Id. art. 15.
156. Id. art. 5(b).
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for respecting human rights of other peoples in light of foreign in-
telligence missions, the government lacks a most compelling source
of authority for maintaining the present restrictions.
Additionally, while it may be argued that an open recognition
of the application of human rights to intelligence activities may cause
the government to appear weak, it would tend to assure the public
that the intelligence community abides by some standard of de-
cency. As a result, the public would feel more secure knowing that
the CIA is operating within guidelines. It is irrelevant if the intel-
ligence community appears to be weak when it is, in fact,
strong. Speculation that national security interests are being jeop-
ardized is not significant if the CIA is successfully carrying out its
intelligence duties within the restrictions of Executive Order 12,333.
In response to the demands for reform in the intelligence com-
munity by Congress, President Carter signed into effect Executive
Order 12,036 to guide the conduct of the intelligence commu-
nity. President Reagan later revised this order when he issued his
version, Executive Order 12,333. While many of the government's
past intelligence activities violated international law, President Reagan
made no reference to any document of international law or to human
rights principles to serve as a basis for restricting our government's
conduct. The restrictions imposed by the Executive Order, never-
theless, prohibit abuses listed in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the UN Charter.
If the government were to link human rights to the conduct of
the intelligence community, it would have a most compelling source
of authority for adhering to the restrictions imposed by the Executive
Order. Recognizing the applicability of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, for example, would not only persuade the government
not to abuse powers as it did in the past, it would also compel the
government to be aware of other human rights.
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